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AIPCN-France

Systeme de protection de la
Nouvelle Orléans contre les
tempêtes cycloniques :
Katrina, ses impacts et le
nouveau système de défense
en voie d'achèvement

Geoffroy Caude , Président AIPCN





PIANC

AIPCN-France

Le diaporama ci-après a été présenté par Geoffroy Caude à la section française AIPCN-France le 24 février 2012

Il reprend notamment des éléments présentés lors de la conférence SmartRivers 2011 de PIANC et lors des journées scientifiques et techniques du CETMEF en 2006

Des informations complémentaires sont disponibles sur le site suivant du ministère de la Défense des USA:

<http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/hps2/>



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nouveau systeme de defense
en voie d'achèvement**

sources CETMEF JST 2006

John Headland Moffat and Nicholl

AIPCN Smart Rivers 2011

Geoffroy Caude , Président AIPCN


Sommaire

- 1- Le cyclone Katrina
- 2- Le système de protection anti-cyclonique antérieur
- 3 - Effets du cyclone Katrina
- 4- Le projet de GNOHSRRS
- 5- Les travaux et leurs conditions de succès
- 6- Des questions à approfondir

Plan de situation de la côte de Louisiane

LACPR General Project Area








1- Le cyclone Katrina

**Hurricane Katrina
1445 UTC 29 August 2005
GOES-12 visible channel
over a MODIS true-color background**

GOES Project NASA-GSFC



Niveau des surcotes cycloniques exprimé en pieds



Maximum Significant Wave Height (ft)




Figure 4-7. Lake Pontchartrain maximum modeled significant wave height and corresponding mean direction for 0030 UTC on 28 August to 0000 UTC on 30 August 2005 (wave heights in feet).

Maximum Significant Wave Height (ft)






Figure 4-28. Southeast Louisiana modeled wave height and direction for 1200 UTC on 29 August 2005 (wave heights in feet); expanded view for St. Bernard and upper Plaquemines Parishes.


Zoom sur le lac Pontchartrain et le Mississippi



2- Consistance du système de protection avant le cyclone Katrina

- 1- Un système composé de levées , de murs anti-tempête et de stations de pompage, destiné à éviter les submersions et les inondations liées aux précipitations
- 2- Un système édifié au fil du temps sur plusieurs décennies, de part et d'autre du Mississippi et au sud du lac Pontchartrain
- 3- Des demandes antérieures auprès du Gouvernement Fédéral non satisfaites, notamment pour compléter le système en évitant les remontées par le MRGO

Lake Pontchartrain & Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project



New Orleans to Venice Hurricane Protection Project





U.S. ARMY


US Army Corps of Engineers






City of New Orleans Ground Elevations and Topography




From Canal St. at Mississippi River to the Lakefront at U.N.O.





Detail "A"




Detail "A"

T-Wall


I-Wall

3-1 Les effets du cyclone

Lake Pontchartrain



Lake Pontchartrain, LA and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project




updated Sept 9, 2005

17th St Canal



London Ave Canal




High Water Marks
Elevation in FT NAVD88

Preliminary

Inner Harbour Navigation canal

IHNC







Figure 2. Location of Breaches in Orleans Parish, East Bank

Orleans East Bank Reconstruction Area

- Damaged
- No Significant Damage



Local Authorities

- Orleans Levee District
- Orleans Parish Government
- N.O. Sewerage and Water Board
- Louisiana DOTD

Hurricane Protection System

- 19.2 miles of levee and floodwall
- 13 pump stations
- 15 roadway floodgates

Damage

- 1.1 miles of levee and floodwall
- 13 pump stations



17th St. Canal I-wall Breach



London Ave. Canal Breach



Canal Breach at Mirabeau



**US Army Corps
of Engineers**

Inner Harbor Navigation Canal Reconstruction Area

- Damaged
- No Significant Damage



Flooding of Container Storage Yard



Northern 9th Ward Breach



Sheetpile Floodwall Collapse



Local Authorities

- Orleans Levee District
- Port of New Orleans
- Louisiana DOTD

Hurricane Protection System

- 12.3 miles of floodwall and levee

Damage

- 5 miles of floodwall and levee



US Army Corps
of Engineers

As of 24 2200 OCT 05

17th Street Canal Breach



Figure 3. Aerial Photograph of the 17th Street Canal Breach Looking South From the Old Hammond

London Avenue Canal Breach



Figure 28. South Breach, London Avenue Canal

London Avenue Canal N. Breach



Figure 29. North Breach, London Avenue Canal



Figure 12-6. NOE6_B. Scoured Section on Protected Side at Lakefront Airport Floodwall



Figure 12-10. NOE7_B Typical Crown and Landside Scouring



Figure 11-4. Scour and Erosion on the Protected Side of the IHNC Adjacent to the Ninth Ward in the Vicinity of the South Breach



Figure 13-5. Scour Pattern "A" on East Side IHNC near N. Claiborne Ave. Bridge




Figure 13-6. Existing Levee and I-Wall Drawing for IHNC East. Note that scoured soil included the "structure backfill" zone (from drawing file H-4-25157, IHNC East Levee from Lock to Florida Ave. Floodwall, sheet 12 of 15)





Figure 15-30. Surge overtopping an IHNC wall with 1 foot, 5 second waves. The wall elevation is specified as 1ft below the surge. The top plot gives the water surface and pressure distribution, the lower plot gives the fluid speed field.



Figure 11-5. Scour and Erosion Leading to the Failure of the I-Wall on the IHNC Adjacent the South Breach (9th Ward)

New Orleans East Reconstruction Area

- Damaged
- No Significant Damage
- Non-Federal Levee



Local Authorities

- Orleans Levee District
- Orleans Parish Government
- N.O. Sewerage and Water Board
- Louisiana DOTD

Hurricane Protection System

- 39 miles of exterior levee and floodwall (I-wall)
- 8 miles of interior levee
- 8 pump stations
- 2 highway floodgates
- 1 railroad floodgate

Damage

- 4.6 miles of exterior levee and floodwall
- 8 pump stations



Citrus Back Levee



Air Products Breach



Intracoastal Waterway Breach



US Army Corps
of Engineers

New Orleans East

High Water Marks
Elevation in FT NAVD88



Preliminary



Figure 12-44. NOE3_D Sheetpile Wall Failure (near Sta 772+00 B/L New Orleans East Back Levee)
(Coordinates 30 deg 01 min 04.30 sec N, 89 deg 53 min 49.36 sec W)

St. Bernard Reconstruction Area

Bayou Bienvenue Control Structure

- Damaged
- No Significant Damage
- Non-Federal Levee

Bayou Dupre Control Structure

Creedmore Drainage Structure

Local Authorities

- Lake Borgne Basin Levee District / Orleans Levee District
- St. Bernard Parish Government
- Louisiana DOTD

Hurricane Protection System


- 30 miles of exterior levee and floodwall
- 22 miles of non-federal interior levee
- 8 pump stations
- 2 control structures
- 6 floodgates

Damage

- 8 miles of exterior levee and floodwall (I-wall)
- 1.4 miles of non-federal interior levee
- 8 pump stations
- 2 control structures
- 4 floodgates



Bayou Bienvenue Control Structure



Breach near Pipeline Canal



Bayou Dupre Control Structure



US Army Corps of Engineers

St Bernard and 9th Ward






Figure 13-68. 2,500 ft. of Levee Along MRGO from Bayou Dupre to STA 1007+91 That Lost Approximately 8' of Elevation



Figure 13-76. End of Sheetpile Wall at B/L Sta 980+58, Along the MRGO (St. Bernard Parish). Note that scour occurred along the sheetpile wall and minimally beyond the levee transition. Approximate sheetpile elevation was 17 ft and levee crown elevation was 13 ft. Beyond the transition, the levee crown elevation was approximately 17 ft. The approximate storm surge overtopping crest was 4 ft over the sheetpile and 1 ft over the transition levee






Figure 16-1. MRGO levee damage determined from LIDAR surveys: Station 0 to 4,500 ft



3-2 Chronologie reconstituée de Katrina dans ses effets de submersion de la ville

FLASH FLOOD

Hurricane Katrina's Inundation of New Orleans, August 29, 2005

— By Dan Swenson, staff artist —




TIME




0:00

LEGEND



Breach



Levees



Flooded land



Compromised levee

CONTROL PANEL

Back



Next

SCENE

1

New Orleans, August 29, 2005



New Orleans, August 29, 2005



5 a.m.: Katrina's storm surge begins pounding the MR-GO levee. By dawn, levee sections crumble and Lake Borgne advances into wetlands toward St. Bernard Parish.

TIME
● AM
● PM
5:00

LEGEND
★ Breach
▭ Levees
■ Flooded land
▭ Compromised levee

CONTROL PANEL
Back ◀ ▶ Next

SCENE
3

New Orleans, August 29, 2005




New Orleans, August 29, 2005



New Orleans, August 29, 2005

6:50 a.m.: Storm surge from the “funnel” reaches the Industrial Canal. Water overtops floodwalls and levees on both sides, but the worst is still ahead.



New Orleans, August 29, 2005



New Orleans, August 29, 2005




7:45 a.m.: Two floodwall sections on the east side of the Industrial Canal fall, releasing a wall of water into the Lower 9th Ward, tossing homes and cars around like toys. The water also pours into Arabi and Chalmette.

TIME ● AM ● PM 7:45	LEGEND ★ Breach ▭ Levees ■ Flooded land ▬ Compromised levee	CONTROL PANEL Back ◀ ▶ Next	SCENE 8
--	--	---------------------------------------	--------------------------

New Orleans, August 29, 2005

To the north, a one-mile stretch of floodwall on the south side of Lakefront Airport is topped by surge from Lake Pontchartrain, adding to already severe flooding in eastern New Orleans.

8:30 a.m.: Lake Borgne advances to St. Bernard Parish's second line of defense, easily topping the 7-foot to 9-foot 40-Arpent Canal levee and filling neighborhoods from Poydras to Chalmette.




TIME ● AM ● PM 8:30	LEGEND ★ Breach ▭ Levees ■ Flooded land ▬ Compromised levee	CONTROL PANEL Back ◀ ▶ Next	SCENE 9
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New Orleans, August 29, 2005

About two miles west, surge reaches an embankment at the foot of the Orleans Avenue Canal that is 6 feet lower than the floodwalls. Water tops the embankment and pours into City Park.

9 a.m.: Surge rises to 10 feet in the London Avenue Canal and levee wall panels on both sides start bending. Water leaks into yards, but the flow is still minor.




TIME



9:00

LEGEND



Flooded land

Compromised levee

CONTROL PANEL




SCENE

10

New Orleans, August 29, 2005



New Orleans, August 29, 2005



9:45 a.m.: Several 17th Street Canal levee wall panels fail, releasing a roaring torrent of water into Lakeview. Water from this breach eventually fills much of midtown New Orleans and parts of Metairie.




On the north shore, Katrina makes landfall near Slidell. Storm surge is 15 feet at the Lake Pontchartrain shoreline and reaches more than five miles inland at some points. St. Tammany Parish neighborhoods from the Rigolets all the way to Madisonville are flooded.

TIME ● AM ● PM 9:45	LEGEND ★ Breach ▭ Levees ■ Flooded land ▭ Compromised levee	CONTROL PANEL Back ◀ ▶ Next	SCENE 12
--	--	---------------------------------------	---------------------------


New Orleans, August 29, 2005



New Orleans, August 29-September 1, 2005



New Orleans, September 1, 2005



Continuous animation




Replay the interactive graphic




Rolling credits

10 M SPOT Satellite Image: 2 Sept 2005



If Levees Had Held



4-1 Quel diagnostic pour des pistes de solution ?

1- Un cyclone de niveau supérieur au système de protection en place et la localisation côtière la plus défavorable

2- Une résilience partielle du système antérieur aux submersions (sauf localement) mais pas du tout aux brèches

3- Des stations de pompage non résilientes

4- Une possible remontée des surcotes par le Mississippi River Gulf Outlet Canal

5- Une érosion côtière controversée limitant les zones tampons de stockage des volumes de surcote



Hurricane Katrina

Aug 29, 2005



- One of America's largest natural disasters
- Cat 5 less than 12 hrs before landfall
- 127 MPH wind at Louisiana landfall
- Maximum surge of 28 to 30 feet (8.5 to 9+ meters) along Mississippi coast

Hurricane Rita

Sep 24, 2005




- Cat 4 less than 12 hrs before landfall
- 175 MPH (281 KM) max sustained winds in Gulf of Mexico
- 120 MPH (193 KM) max sustained winds at landfall
- Cat 3 strength at landfall

100+ Years of Land Change for Coastal Louisiana


SUMMARY

Coastal Louisiana has lost an average of 34 square miles of land, primarily marsh, per year for the last 50 years. From 1932 to 2000, coastal Louisiana has lost 1,900 square miles of land, roughly an area the size of the state of Delaware. If nothing is done to stop this land loss, Louisiana could potentially lose approximately 700 square miles of land, or about equal to the size of the greater Washington D.C.-Baltimore area, in the next 50 years. Further, Louisiana accounted for an estimated 90 percent of the coastal marsh loss in the lower 48 states during the 1990s.



LEGEND

- Land Loss 1932 - 2000
- Predicted Land Loss 2000 - 2050
- Land Gain 1932 - 2000
- Predicted Land Gain 2000 - 2050
- Louisiana Land Change Study Boundary



4-2 La maturation du projet : bref panorama des pistes de solution imaginées en 2006

- 1- Un nouveau système d'ouvrages de
défense
- 2- Une conception rénovée des levées et des
murs
- 3- Des barrages bloquant la remontée des
eaux du MRGO et
vers le canal Pontchartrain(IHNC)



Multiple Lines of Defense




Elements include:

Coastal restoration/protection

Structural measures

Non-structural features


ASSESSMENT OF HURRICANE PROTECTION IN SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA, HURRICANE BARRIER PLAN



LEGEND

-  Hurricane Barrier Plan Alignment
-  Secondary Levees
-  Control Structure
-  Pump Station (P.S.)
-  Lock
-  Floodgate - Navigable
-  Diversion Structure

SCALE
MILES



STOPPING THE SURGE

Although still working on the final plan, the Army Corps of Engineers said it probably will use a system of high levees and floodgates in building a Category 5 hurricane protection system for the New Orleans metro area. Here are some of the possible tools expected to be used:

CATEGORY 5 PRICE TAG


Estimated costs of 54. Terrestrial to Coastal segment

Construction of barrier facilities

1) 104M through Metairie from complex	\$500 million
2) South of Algiers from through Gulf Member from complex	\$300 million
3) 104M through Metairie from through Mississippi River Gulf Outlet sector gate	\$500 million
4) South of Metairie from through the Mississippi River	\$100 million

Total construction	\$1.4 billion
Engineering and design	\$240 million
Operation and maintenance	\$100 million
TOTAL ESTIMATED COST	\$1.74 billion

● Possible
● In use
● Gate
● Levee



SLUICE GATE

Sluice gates are similar to spillways and locks, but they are used to control water levels. In this case, they probably would be used to control water levels in the Mississippi River. They are a type of gate that allows water to flow through a narrow opening, but is closed when a storm approaches.



BUTTERFLY AND TAINTER GATES

Large gates in the water are known as tainter and butterfly gates. They are used to control the flow of water in a canal or river. They are a type of gate that allows water to flow through a narrow opening, but is closed when a storm approaches.



Butterfly gates have two curved blades that can be adjusted to control the flow of water. Tainter gates have a single curved blade that can be adjusted to control the flow of water.

Butterfly gates have two curved blades that can be adjusted to control the flow of water. Tainter gates have a single curved blade that can be adjusted to control the flow of water.

SECTOR GATE

Used for larger, deeper waterways that have a lot of water. They are a type of gate that allows water to flow through a narrow opening, but is closed when a storm approaches.



U.S. 90 T-WALL

It is the tallest wall in the world, standing 90 feet high. It is a type of wall that allows water to flow through a narrow opening, but is closed when a storm approaches.



HIGHER EARTHEN LEVEES

The height of Category 5 levees would vary depending on the height of the facility, but they would be at least 10 feet high. They are a type of levee that allows water to flow through a narrow opening, but is closed when a storm approaches.



From Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District

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Category 5 hurricane protection system for the New Orleans metro area. Here are some of the possible tools expected to be used:

CATEGORY 5 PRICE TAG

Estimated costs of St. Bernard's Coastline segment

Distribution of base options:

1) Canal through Bayou Bienvenue	\$200 million
2) Gate of Bayou Bienvenue through Chief Mouton Pass complex	\$500 million
3) Canal to Chief Mouton Pass through Mississippi River Gulf Outlet sector gate	\$600 million
4) Gate of Chief Mouton Pass through the Mississippi River Outlet	\$170 million

Total construction	\$1.400 million
Engineering and design	\$290 million
Operation and administration	\$90 million
TOTAL ESTIMATED COST	\$1.780 million*

- Possible
- Level
- Gate
- Sector




BUTTERFLY AND TAINIER GATES

Large structures in the water to temporarily prevent and divert storm surge. Butterfly gates are made of many sections that can be individually disconnected and moved to the up-drift or down-drift area once storm surge is over.


Butterfly Gate (left): Has many sections that can be individually disconnected and moved to the up or down-drift area.

Tainter Gate (right): Contains a number of sections with rounded gates that can be raised or lowered.



SECTOR GATE


Proposed for larger, deeper water area that blocks storm surge. These gates may be raised or lowered and the storm surge blocked.



SECTOR GATE
 Proposed for larger, deeper waterways that handle barge traffic, these gates may be raised or lowered and the structure rotated.



U.S. 90 T-WALL
 A rubble bulk along a 25-mile-long section of U.S. 90, running from the Houston to Clearwater Canal, being gate at several points along the wall. Other sections are made to control and maintain flow outside the levee system.



HIGHER EARTHEN LEVEES
 The design's Category II levee would vary depending on the height of the location but Corps officials estimate they could be as high as 20 feet, and as wide as 200 feet.
 Proposed with compacted fill layer below
 Improved levee
 Existing levee
 Flood risk
 Proposed levee
 Flood risk
 Compact fill incorporated in layers below




FIGURE L-24 Typical Soil-Cement Section








FIGURE L-25 Typical Geotextile-Reinforced Embankment Section



FLOODSIDE

SCALE: 1" = 40'

PROTECTED SIDE



5-1 Les conditions clef du succès du nouveau système

- 1- Une loi programme évitant l'annualité budgétaire avec une continuité politique des deux présidents Bush et Obama
- 2- Un travail à marches forcées (quatre ans)
- 3- Une disposition foncière permettant à l'US Corps of Engineers d'imposer des ouvrages chez des particuliers
- 4- Une mobilisation d'ingénierie, d'expertise et de contre-expertise sans précédent
- 5- Un projet global incluant la reconstitution de zones humides tampon
- 6- Un large dispositif de concertation national et local



Greater New Orleans Hurricane & Storm Damage Risk Reduction System:

Our Mission and Commitment


- Repair the damages, making what was there before whole again.
- Strengthen and improve the system and provide 100-year level of protection capable of withstanding the effects of a storm having a 1% chance of occurring each year.
- Current funding level \$14.6 B (fully funded).
- Study and recommend solutions to provide higher levels of protection; restore and protect coastal wetlands (LaCPR).



U.S. ARMY



Greater New Orleans Hurricane and Storm Damage Risk Reduction System (GNHSDRRS)





US Army Corps of Engineers




Southwest Coastal Study



GREATER NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE AND STORM DAMAGE RISK REDUCTION SYSTEM (HSDRRS) Status - June 2011



US Army Corps of Engineers



West Return Floodwall (Northern Segment) LPV-03.2B
Protected side stability berm along existing wall and sand bags between discharge pipes at pump station

West Return Floodwall (Southern Segment) LPV-03.2A
Protected side stability berm along existing wall and sand baskets placed on crown of existing levee

Airport Runway Levee LPV-03d.2
Sand baskets placed along 750 ft of existing crown between railroad gate and leading lights

Bridge Abutments and Floodwall Tie-ins at Causeway LPV-17.2
The S.L.D. will place large sandbags across Causeway Blvd in advance of storm arrival

Jefferson Parish Fronting Protection LPV-89.2
Additional H Piles and concrete slab will reinforce existing foundation and walls @ Elmwood and Suburban

Seabrook Floodgate Complex HMC-01
Sand Cell Celler Dam

Permanent Canal Closures and Pumps PCCP-01
Invert Closure Structures

Seabrook Floodgate Complex

Western Tie-In Bayou Verret Closure Structure WBV-74
Structural braced sheetpile across bypass channel and sand baskets

Western Tie-In UP Railroad Floodgate and LA 18 Hwy Crossing WBV-77
Structural sheetpile and sand baskets at railroad crossing

Western Tie-In BNSF Railroad Floodgate WBV-75
Structural sheetpile and sand baskets at railroad crossing

Western Tie-In Hay 80 Crossing WBV-73
Sand baskets at utility crossings and across Hwy 80 deployed for storm threat

Bayou Segnette Floodwall WBV-34
Sand baskets

Lake Catahoula Pump Station Fronting Protection WBV-156a.2
Sand baskets

Lake Catahoula Levee PS to Bayou Segnette State Park WBV-156a.2
Structural sheetpile at utility crossing and sand baskets

Westwego to Harvey Utility Crossings WBV-14
Sand baskets

Arms and MI Kennedy Pump Station Fronting Protection WBV-37
Sand baskets

Segnette Pump Station Fronting Protection WBV-16b
Structural sheetpile and sand baskets

Bayou Segnette Complex WBV-16.2
Invert Barge Gate; structural sheetpile and sand baskets

GIWW West Closure Complex WBV-50
Invert sheetpile wall between navigation gate and 40-ft floodwall west side of GIWW

Eastern Tie-In Hero Canal Closure Structure WBV-09b
Structural braced sheetpile across bypass channel and sand baskets

Eastern Tie-In to Hwy 23 (Belle Chasse Hwy) Closure WBV-09a
Sand baskets; stodpiled and deployed for storm threat

Assessment Guide

- 100-yr Risk Reduction Established
- Work Suspended Until High River Stages Recede

Note:

- Concrete structures are built to a higher elevation to accommodate future subsidence
- Levees will require future life to accommodate subsidence

Engineered Interim Structures
Meets 100-year design criteria. Temporary in nature, to be replaced by permanent structures

Engineered Construction Closures
Rapidly deployed measure, i.e., sand baskets, used to close dike/levee access points that are under construction, like railroad/highway crossings

Secondary Line of Protection
Westerly River Levee (Non-HSDRRS)

River Walls

Locks

Pump Station

Different Sections of Levee/Floodwall

ALL ELEVATIONS ARE NAVD 83 (2004-05)

Date: 07 MAY 2011
Edition: 1.0 - 02/09 Map ID No: 11-039
Map produced by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers - New Orleans
<http://www.mcrs.com/eng/rdrrs/pol/rdrrsstatusmap.pdf>


Highlights:

- New Orleans area has best perimeter defense in its history
- Strengthened and improved nearly 120 miles of levees, floodwalls, gated structures and pump stations
- 102,000 acres of low-lying west-Mississippi River areas will be protected when river stages recede
- Risk of flooding from storms surge greatly reduced as construction continues

With the 100-year level of protection, you have a 0.2% chance every year of flooding this deep from Hurricanes

Notes:


- The depth map tool is a relative indicator of progress, over time, demonstrating risk reduction as a function of construction progress
- The water surface elevations are mean values
- The scale sensitivity of the legend is +/- 2 feet
- The info does not depict interior drainage modeling results
- The storm surge is characterized as the result of a probabilistic analysis of 5 to 6 storm parameters of a suite of 76 storms and not a particular event




Before Katrina, you had a 0.2% chance every year of flooding this deep from Hurricanes

Notes:


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- The info does not depict interior drainage modeling results
- The storm surge is characterized as the result of a probabilistic analysis of 5 to 6 storm parameters of a suite of 152 storms and not a particular event





Legend


- Floodwall Structure
- Gate Structures
- MRGO Closure
- Staging Area
- Access Channel
- Gate ROW
- Proposed Open Water Disposal Areas



1949



2001



2007

5-2 La réalisation des travaux
présentée par l'US Corps et les
entreprises de travaux lors de la
conférence Smart Rivers
en septembre 2012



Greater New Orleans Area Hurricane & Storm Damage Risk Reduction System

Smart Rivers Conference, Opening Plenary Session

Col. Edward Fleming

Commander, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Angela DeSoto-Duncan

Director of Civil Works, Tetra Tech - INCA

Dale Miller

Regional Vice-President, Tetra Tech - INCA

Lt Col (Ret) Vic Zillmer


Resident Manager, IHNC Lake Borgne Surge Barrier, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

September 14, 2011








The Four Major New Orleans Flood Risks

Separate, but overlapping or related interagency systems or programs to address each!




The 1 June 2011 Mission



-  Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity
Levees and Floodwalls (~90 Miles)
-  Westbank and Vicinity
Levees and Floodwalls (~30 Miles)
-  Mississippi River Levees
-  Major Flooding 2005 (Approximate)





3 Glass Balls that Cannot Be Dropped



PUBLIC SAFETY DEPENDS ON ALL 3...




Three Strategic Improvements of the Hurricane and Storm Damage Risk Reduction System (HSDRRS)



1. **Block five storm surge avenues** from a 100-year storm surge.
2. Raise and strengthen levees and floodwalls to the **same design guidelines**.
3. **Storm proof key pump stations** so they can function when there is flooding in the city.


Block The Five Storm Surge Avenues

(From a 100-year storm surge)



Raise and Strengthen Levees / Floodwalls





Storm Proof Key Pump Stations



**Repair 61 pump
stations
(\$103 Mil)**



**Storm proof 49 pump
stations
(\$322 Mil)**



**Construct 5 safe
houses
(\$18 Mil)**



A Priority of Two Administrations



*“Now, even as we continue our recovery efforts, we’re also focusing on preparing for future threats so that there is never another disaster like Katrina. The largest civil works project in American history is underway to build a fortified levee system. And as I — just as I pledged as a candidate, **we’re going to finish this system by next year so that this city is protected against a 100-year storm.**”*

President Barack Obama

Xavier University, New Orleans


August 29, 2010



The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Team

• People:

- Corps wide - 34,000
- Civil Works - 24,000
- MVD - 5,000



The Delivery Team Includes:



Committed to ensuring that New Orleans can handle a 100-year storm surge by 1 June 2011.

Our Teammates Include:



Working together to ensure that New Orleans can handle a 100-year storm



Smart Rivers 2011

SEPTEMBER 13 - 16, 2011
Westin Canal Place
New Orleans, Louisiana, U.S.A.



A few of our key stakeholders include...



Garret Graves
Chairman, OCPR



Tim Doody
President, SLFPA-East



Mitch Landrieu
Mayor, City of New Orleans



Craig Taffaro
President, St. Bernard
Parish



John Young
President, Jefferson Parish



Marcia St. Martin
Executive Director,
Sewerage and Water Board
of New Orleans



Gary LaGrange
President & CEO, Port of
New Orleans



Inner Harbor Navigation Canal



Lake Borgne Surge Barrier




The largest single-day concrete batch plant production in the U.S. since the Hoover Dam.

Lake Borgne Surge Barrier

**Largest Single Project Ever Built
in Louisiana**

**Wall is Now
Complete**

Lake Borgne Surge Barrier

A wide-angle photograph of the Lake Borgne Surge Barrier. The barrier consists of a long, low wall with a series of dark, angled, slanted panels that create a rhythmic pattern. Above the wall, a line of white, rectangular structures is visible. The barrier is situated in a flat, green landscape with a body of water in the foreground and a blue sky with light clouds in the background.

***Largest Design-Build Civil
Works Project in the History
of the Corps***



Smart Rivers 2011

SEPTEMBER 13 - 16, 2011
Westin Canal Place
New Orleans, Louisiana, U.S.A.



IHNC-Lake Borgne Surge Barrier



IHNC-Lake Borgne Surge Barrier




Bayou Bienvenue

*Gulf
Intracoastal
Waterway*


Golden Triangle Marsh

*Mississippi River
Gulf Outlet
(MRGO)*

Geologic Profile



M	MARSH
ID	INTERDISTRIBUTARY
IDE	INTRADELTA
PD	PRODELTA
B	BEACH
R	REEF
P	PLEISTOCENE



IHNC Storage Capacity

For a 100-yr Storm Surge:

- Closure elevation: +3 feet
- Rainfall (10-year, 24 hour event): +0.8 feet
- Pumping into the basin: +2 feet
- Overtopping: +1.5 feet
- Wind setup: +0.5 feet
- Water elevation of less than 8 feet

For a 500-yr storm surge, the IHNC Basin will rise to an elevation of less than 10 feet.



The IHNC Basin will be able to safely hold water to the top of the wall, which is at elevation +12 feet at its lowest point.

(Hurricane Gustav Elevation)



Overtopping Analysis: Franco & Franco Method

Calculates overtopping

Maximum allowable storage capacity behind IHNC HPP is equal to a 1.5 ft rise in water level of 226.5 million ft^3 on the protected side of the barrier.

Input: 1% Chance of exceedance values of $H_{5\%}$, $T_{5\%}$, Still Water Level (SWL), wall height, wall length, and wall type coefficient.

Output: Run through Monte Carlo analysis to produce 50% and 90% Monte Carlo confidence intervals.





GIWW Gate System Rendering






Bayou Bienvenue Vertical Lift Gate Rendering



Protected side

Flood side





Soldier Piles



First Pile Driven May 9, 2009




Last Pile Driven Oct 23, 2009



Smart Rivers 2011 Batter Piles

SEPTEMBER 13 - 16, 2011
Mississippi Canal Place
New Orleans, Louisiana, U.S.A.



Template



Mobile Platform

Soldier, Closure, Batter Piles



Temporary Trestle

Interstitial Space

Closure Piles


Batter Piles

Soldier Piles

Grout Bag Placement



**Grout Bag
Infill**




Trestle Construction



66" Concrete Pile Infill Reinforcement






Precast Caps




17 Feet Long, 96 Tons




Cast in Place Concrete Section



6 Feet
Wide



Expansion Joints



17 of 17 Set **Complete!**

Parapet Wall



Cast in Place
Complete!



Lake Borgne Surge Barrier – GIWW Gates




Barge Gate
Delivered: Feb 2011

Sector Gate
Installed: May 2011

Barge Gate

Sector Gate



Bayou Bienvenue Vertical Lift Gate




Bayou Bienvenue Gate Installation



Installed Gate

Bayou Bienvenue Vertical Lift Gate
Installed: March 2011



Surge Barrier Facts and Figures

- 1,271 spun-cast 66-inch-diameter concrete soldier piles
- 2,514 closure piles
- 647 steel batter piles
- 673 pre-cast and cast-in-place concrete caps
- 7,490 linear feet of parapet wall
- Two 150-foot-wide gates (sector gate and barge gate) at the GIWW and one 56-foot-wide vertical lift gate at Bayou Bienvenue
- Enough steel to construct 8 Eiffel Towers
- Enough concrete to fill one football field, 94 feet deep
- The project involves 160 miles of piles - approximately 20 miles more than the distance between New Orleans and Lafayette.


Project Status

- The design of the Lake Borgne Surge Barrier is approximately 99% complete.
- Overall project is approximately 91% complete.
- The three gates are approximately 60% complete.
- Construction is scheduled to be complete in October 2012.

6- Questions à approfondir

- 1- Le processus d'approbation technique de 2007 (peer review)
- 2- Le choix du niveau de protection retenu
- 3- Le mode de communication adopté pour assurer l'acceptabilité du projet
- 4- L'imbrication des niveaux de décision
- 5- Les raisons de l'absence de communication technique sur un projet de cette ampleur
- 6- Le degré d'implication des experts hollandais

6-1 schématisation de la revue des pairs (peer-review)



Acronyms not defined above:

CPRA = Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority
 IEPR = Independent External Peer Review
 MVD = Mississippi Valley Division
 MVN = Mississippi Valley, New Orleans District
 NAB = North Atlantic, Baltimore District
 NAD = North Atlantic Division
 PCX = Planning Center of Expertise
 PM = Project Manager
 PRO = Protection and Restoration Office
 SLFPA-E = Southeast LA Flood Protection Authority - East
 SLFPA-W = Southeast LA Flood Protection Authority - West
 SPM = Senior Project Manager
 WRDA 07 = Water Resources Development Act 2007


↔ Programmatic Coordination
 - - - Project-Specific Coordination

Figure 1. TFH/PCX WRDA 07 IEPR Organization

Before Katrina, you had a 0.2% chance every year of flooding this deep from Hurricanes

Notes:

- The depth map tool is a relative indicator of progress, over time, demonstrating risk reduction as a function of construction progress
- The water surface elevations are mean values
- The scale sensitivity of the legend is +/- 2 feet
- The info does not depict interior drainage modeling results
- The storm surge is characterized as the result of a probabilistic analysis of 5 to 8 storm parameters of a suite of 152 storms and not a particular event



Depth of Flooding

Darkest Blue	> 8
Dark Blue	6 - 8
Medium Blue	4 - 6
Light Blue	2 - 4
White	0 - 2

Assumes 50% Pumping Capacity

Image © 2004 TerraMetrics

Image © 2004 DigitalGlobe

© 2007 Google™
MARCH 08

Currently, you have a 0.2% chance every year of flooding this deep from Hurricanes

Notes:

- The depth map tool is a relative indicator of progress, over time, demonstrating risk reduction as a function of construction progress
- The water surface elevations are mean values
- The scale sensitivity of the legend is +/- 2 feet
- The info does not depict interior drainage modeling results
- The storm surge is characterized as the result of a probabilistic analysis of 5 to 6 storm parameters of a suite of 152 storms and not a particular event



With the 100-year level of protection, you have a 0.2% chance every year of flooding this deep from Hurricanes

Notes:
The depth map tool is a relative indicator of progress, over time, demonstrating risk reduction as a function of construction progress.
The water surface elevations are mean values.
The scale sensitivity of the legend is +/- 2 feet.
The info does not depict interior drainage modeling results.
The storm surge is characterized as the result of a probabilistic analysis of 10,000 storm parameters of a suite of 76 storms and not a particular event.

Depth of Flooding	Range
Dark Blue	> 8
Blue	6 - 8
Light Blue	4 - 6
Very Light Blue	2 - 4
White	0 - 2

Assumes 50% Pumping Capacity

